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1■ Convergent results are showing that climate 
change will fundamentally alter global food 
production patterns, with negative crop 
productivity impacts likely expected in low 
latitude and tropical regions but somewhat 
positive in high latitude regions.  
■  Water mediates much of climate change impact 
on agriculture and increased water scarcity in 
many regions of the world present a major 
challenge for climate adaptation, food security 
and nutrition. Tackling the climate-food-water-
trade nexus requires deploying coherent cross-
sectoral, national, and regional strategies.
■  Climate impacts on future food supply strongly 
suggest an enhanced role for trade with 
expanded flows from the mid-to-high latitude 
regions to the low latitudes regions, where 
production and export potential could be 
reduced. Progress on climate-compatible 
trade policies requires resolving the trade versus 
environment trade-offs and ensuring that future 
trade rules are more aligned with climate 
objectives.
■  Combatting climate change goes hand in hand 
with alleviating poverty which requires 
mainstreaming climate responses within pro-
poor development strategies. Mainstreaming 
should promote ‘no regrets’ actions that target 
improved resiliency to current and future climate 
impacts, especially for the poor and most 
vulnerable groups.
■  Robust and reliable science-based evidence is 
critical to the development of policies to address 
climate impacts on food security and trade. A 
strategic and structured dialogue is required 
between science and policy and between global 
and regional impact research with local 
validation to support policy action.
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A. PART ONE
Climate change impact 
modelling – current  
status and future direction
Future land use and food security will 
be determined largely by the dynamics and 
interactions of agricultural markets, climatic 
suitability, adaptive capacity and direct 
interventions along the supply chain. Perhaps 
more than any other major economic sector, 
agriculture is highly dependent on local climatic 
conditions and is therefore expected to be highly 
sensitive to changes in climate that are expected 
in coming decades. This sensitivity is compounded 
by increasing pressure on the global agricultural 
system to meet food security objectives and, for 
some countries, to contribute also to national 
energy budgets through bioenergy production. 
Rapid increases in global demand for 
agricultural commodities for food, animal feed and 
fuel are driving dramatic changes in the way we 
think about crops and land use. Along with recent 
supply side shocks driven by extreme weather 
events and other disasters, these conditions 
have led to increasingly wild swings in agricultural 
commodity markets that have some stakeholders 
concerned. In recent years, additional stresses 
on the land-food system are coming from some 
of the very mitigation strategies meant to slow 
climate changes before irreversible impacts occur. 
Many of the proposed strategies rely heavily 
on net emissions reductions through terrestrial 
biosequestration from modified farming practices, 
reducing application of inorganic fertilizer, avoiding 
deforestation or increasing afforestation and 
displacing fossil fuel energy with biomass and 
biofuel crops. 
Conversion of natural lands to crop and/
or livestock production as well as intensifying 
production on existing agricultural lands will have 
significant consequences for the environment, 
such as degradation of soil and water resources, 
increased greenhouse gas emissions and regional 
climate effects. Typical farming practices have 
been shown to reduce soil carbon by as much 
as 50-66 percent from natural levels [1] and there 
is little evidence that management practices 
which could stop or reverse these trends are 
gaining much traction. It has long been known [2] 
that direct effects of land-cover change on, for 
example, surface albedo4 and evapotranspiration 
can be significant drivers of regional patterns of 
warming and can even have significant implications 
for changes in global mean variables. These 
environmental issues pose questions with regard 
to trade-offs of food and biomass production and 
increase the threat of environmental limitations on 
future increases in food production. 
A1. Robust results from 
existing climate change 
impact studies
A1.1 Global impacts of climate trends
Overall expected patterns of climate impacts 
have been largely stable since the first global 
scale analyses [3]. Climate impacts in low-latitude 
regions, given present-day levels of management 
and technology, are clearly expected to be 
negative, even at low levels of warming. Impacts 
in the mid to high latitudes are expected to be 
more mixed, especially at lower levels of warming. 
Some high-latitude regions are expected to benefit 
[4] – sometimes substantially – from warmer 
temperatures and longer growing seasons; 
however, other environmental conditions, such 
as soil quality issues in the far north, will likely 
constrain expansion. 
Recent summary results from the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth 
Assessment (IPCC AR5) [5] and global model 
4 The ratio of reflected radiation from the earth’s 
surface to incident radiation upon it.
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results from the Inter-Sectoral Impacts Model 
Intercomparison Project (ISI-MIP1) [4, 6, 7] have 
largely verified these overall patterns and extended 
them to cover more regions, more crops and 
higher temperatures. These studies have also 
added more information regarding the potential 
for adaptation to ameliorate some portion of 
likely climate impacts to food production [5, 6]. 
Adaptive changes in management – especially 
planting dates, cultivar choice and sometimes 
increased irrigation – have been studied to varying 
extents and are generally estimated to have the 
potential to increase yields by about 7-15 percent 
on average [5], though these results depend 
strongly on the region and crop being considered 
and many questions remain. Increasing the 
concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) 
is widely accepted to have a positive stimulating 
effect on crop yields under a broad range of 
other conditions, primarily through increasing 
the efficiency of photosynthesis, especially in C3 
crops (which include wheat, rice and soybeans). 
The magnitude of this effect, especially in 
environments with high stress from nutrient, or 
other, deficiencies, is still a field of active study and 
debate. 
A1.2  Strengths and weaknesses of 
common model types
A wide array of models has been applied to 
the study of climate impacts, at decadal to 
multidecadal time scales. Models can generally be 
distinguished as primarily mechanistic or primarily 
empirical, though most of them fall somewhere 
between these extremes. Mechanistic models 
are usually based on field-scale crop models 
developed over many decades and tend to have 
the most complex process representations, 
especially with respect to parameterizing farm 
management, soil dynamics and genetic properties 
of different crop cultivars [8-11]. Dynamic global 
vegetation models have generally evolved from 
the opposite direction, starting with global-scale 
land models, often coupled with global earth 
systems models. Researchers have added crops 
and related processes to these models using 
representations of varying complexity, typically with 
a focus on better representing crucial exchange 
processes (e.g. carbon, water and energy balance) 
between land and atmosphere [12-17]. Purely 
empirical models are used to study global climate 
impacts, typically at national or continental scales 
[18, 19]. These models are useful for capturing 
in-sample processes and representing hidden 
variables, but pose challenges for estimation of 
climate impacts at long time scales, where regimes 
of atmospheric carbon, technology, management 
and climate may be fundamentally different from 
the recent historical past. A newer class of models, 
called large-area crop models, uses relatively 
simple representations of key crop processes to 
produce flexible models that can be statistically 
calibrated at large scales to capture hidden 
variables and better reproduce historical trends 
[20-23].
The scale of application of models and 
model-based assessments also leads to various 
trade-offs. Field-scale assessments of climate 
impacts often benefit from very high quality 
input and reference data, available at only a 
handful of experimental sites around the world 
[e.g. 24]. In addition, the relative simplicity of 
model execution and data management for 
these highly localized studies makes it possible 
to consider many different models and explore 
detailed subseasonal process differences and 
uncertainties. Global models require consistent 
global datasets of climate, soils and management. 
Many such datasets have been developed for 
continental or global-scale applications [25-28], 
but there are often trade-offs in terms of quality 
and representational complexity in the process of 
compiling these data. 
Bio-economic models of agriculture and food 
systems (also called agro-economic models) apply 
results from biophysical model applications within 
an economic modelling framework (typically a 
partial or general equilibrium model) [29-35]. These 
models generally use simple representations of 
food production and climate impacts combined 
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figure 1 
The evolution of average yields for three staple cereal crops in three regions  
important to global trade and the food, feed and fuel supply [41]. In each plot, the major 
producer with the highest average per hectare yield is shown (solid blue line), along with  
the producer for whom yields have grown by the highest fraction in the 50-year period  
(dashed yellow line), which is China in all three cases, and an additional region  
(dotted black line) that, while still important to the global supply, has shown substantially 
lower average yields and a generally slower pace of increase (and thus presumably has  
much room to grow given the right conditions)
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with representations of economies, populations, 
markets and other demand forces. These models 
make it possible to parameterize technological 
change and adaptation in response to prices in 
a way that is not possible in a purely biophysical 
assessment. 
A1.3  Other drivers of productivity 
For over 30 years it has been generally accepted 
that trends towards increasing temperatures and 
changing precipitation patterns in agricultural areas 
will have major, generally negative, implications 
for cropland productivity and will increase stress 
on global food production in the coming decades. 
In addition to these changes, a number of other 
related changes in the biosphere could ameliorate 
or compound these impacts. In fact, it has been 
suggested that the food security implications of 
changes in the severity, frequency and extent (both 
spatially and temporally) of drought events [36] 
may affect more people in the future than any other 
climate-related impact [37], though much work is 
still needed to understand how climate trends will 
produce precipitation extremes. On the other side 
of the ledger, increasing concentrations of CO2 in 
the atmosphere – the very same phenomenon that 
drives global warming – can have a positive effect 
on the capacity for photosynthesis and water-use 
efficiency. These effects vary quite substantially 
among different crops, especially between those 
that use C3 and C4 pathways for photosynthesis, 
and among different regions, depending on 
the local aridity and the prevalence of other 
constraining stressors such as nitrogen availability. 
For every aspect of future crop production and 
climate impact, technology and local management 
practices do and will play a crucial role, and the 
interactions of environmental, technological and 
management changes must be better understood 
and better modelled. Technological change in 
the agricultural sector proceeded unevenly in the 
twentieth century (Figure 1) [38]. Maize yields 
have increased steadily in the United States and 
China over the last 50 years and show little sign 
of slowing. Indeed, average yields of maize in 
the United States surpassed 10.3 tonnes per 
hectare in 2009, and these increases are expected 
to continue, at least over the short to medium 
term [39]. At the same time, average yields in 
sub-Saharan Africa have been mostly flat, growing 
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from around 1 tonne per hectare in the 1960s to 
barely more than 1.5 tonnes per hectare over the 
last decade. In the case of wheat, average yields 
in Western Europe have tripled since 1960, but 
have been largely flat with high volatility since the 
mid-1990s, potentially indicating a slowing of 
yield growth [40]. Chinese wheat yields are still 
significantly lower than those obtained in Western 
Europe, and are increasing steadily with little sign 
of slowing. Yields in Russia, meanwhile, have been 
largely flat for over 30 years but have significant 
potential for growth.
Rice, the most important staple food crop for 
a huge portion of the global population, shows a 
very different profile from the other major cereals. 
Japan, long the world leader in rice yields, has 
seen yield growth slow to a crawl over the last 
50 years. China, which is both the world’s largest 
producer and largest consumer of rice, saw 
average yields double from 1960 to 1980 but has 
struggled to keep up yield growth rates since then 
and has also seen flat yield trends since the mid-
1990s. There is still some potential for increased 
rice yields in South and Southeast Asia, however, 
with each region accounting for about a quarter of 
global rice production and averaging 3.5 -4 tonnes 
per hectare in recent years. While in gross terms 
this is substantially less “slack” than is implied 
by low yields in maize and wheat crops in large 
potential bread baskets such as sub-Saharan 
Africa and Russia, recent trends towards increased 
rice yields in these areas show that at least here 
the lower-yielding regions are moving in the right 
direction.
Substantial yield gaps, defined as the difference 
between potential and actual yields, caused by 
imperfect cropland management [42], exist in 
most parts of the world as a result of market 
conditions, the availability of resources such as 
irrigation and fertilizers, and degradation due to 
poor soil management. The International Food and 
Policy Research Institute’s International Model for 
Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and 
Trade (IMPACT) takes the spatial study of climate 
change impacts beyond analysis of the impacts 
of climate on key crops at a national level by 
adding additional analysis that examines global 
trends and other factors that are changing with 
the climate, including gross domestic products 
(GDPs), populations, and agricultural technology 
development and use (Thomas and Rosegrant, 
Chapter 5). The model identifies hotspots under 
climate change where large losses in production 
are projected to occur, but also areas of climate 
opportunity, which may have large gains, and/
or areas that were previously unsuitable but can 
become suitable for crop production at some 
point. Identification of these climate change 
hotspots could then provide important information 
for national policy, as they could be used to aid 
targeting of resources for adaptation (through 
policy intervention) or provide incentives, over the 
longer term, for climate adaptation research – for 
example, to develop agricultural technologies for 
the hotspot regions. In extreme cases, hotspots 
may provide forewarning of areas where agriculture 
could be untenable in the future, leading to shifts 
out of agriculture or migration away from the 
hotspot. Areas identified as climate opportunities, 
in contrast, could become the focus for inward 
investment in agriculture and food sectors.
Historically, there have been fewer 
assessments of climate change impacts on 
livestock than on the arable sector. Calculation of 
the uncertainty in livestock projections needs to 
account for impacts on both feed and fodder, as 
well as uncertainties in meat and dairy production. 
For livestock systems based on grazing, Havlik 
and colleagues (Chapter 6) identified two major 
sources of uncertainty: which particular crop/
grass growth model was used in the impact 
assessment; and what assumptions were made 
about the magnitude of the CO
2 fertilization effect 
on grass growth. They concluded that climate 
change impacts on grass yields, allowing for these 
uncertainties, may substantially alter the relative 
competitiveness of the different systems and hence 
the overall outcome for the livestock sector in the 
future. However, projected changes in global milk 
and meat production by 2050 attributable to direct 
climate change impacts were comparatively small 
compared with other influences on demand for 
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these products. Global price changes differed by 
up to 10 percent from the baseline scenario. More 
substantial differences in uncertainty were found 
at a regional scale. Climate change effects were 
most uncertain in the Near East & North Africa 
and in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in the 
Near East & North Africa, the change in ruminant 
meat production due to climate change varied 
by +/-20 percent, depending on the scenario. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, the effects were the most 
uncertain, but also potentially the most severe; 
ruminant production could increase by 20 percent 
but it could also decrease by 17 percent, with 
most yield scenarios projecting monogastric 
meat production to fall by more than 30 percent 
(Chapter 6).
A2.  Current modelling 
challenges
A2.1  Mechanisms requiring improved 
understanding
Many aspects of modern global agricultural 
impact models and assessments deserve further 
study and improvement, especially with regard 
to the effect of increasing atmospheric CO2 on 
plant growth, grain formation and crop water use 
efficiency. Increasing the level of CO2 improves the 
efficiency of photosynthesis, directly stimulating 
plant growth. It also reduces sensitivity to drought 
conditions by improving the efficiency with which 
crops use the water available in the soil, and can 
even improve nitrogen use efficiency [43]. These 
factors can have a compensatory effect on climate 
impacts, especially in regions where other potential 
stressors, such as soil quality and availability of 
key nutrients, are not constraining. These benefits 
may come with trade-offs in terms of food quality, 
however. Recent work has found that, in addition 
to increased caloric productivity, elevated CO2 
conditions have substantial negative implications 
for food nutrition content, with a 40-50 percent 
increase in CO2 leading to a 5-10 percent 
reduction in the concentrations of zinc, iron and 
protein in some crops [44]. 
Together, these factors will have significant, and 
potentially transformational, implications for global 
food and nutrition security and large-scale drought 
sensitivity. However, global models used to assess 
climate impacts on crops disagree significantly on 
the strength of CO2 fertilization effects, with their 
inclusion doubling or even tripling the range of 
outcomes within the model ensemble [4]. These 
differences are closely linked to whether a given 
model represents the nitrogen cycle and what 
assumptions are made about fertilizer application 
rates and nitrogen availability, now and in the 
future. 
A2.2  Data requirements for model 
improvement
Perhaps the most important factor limiting the 
improvement of field-scale crop models is the 
existence and availability of experimental data, 
especially for conditions well outside normal 
experience, such as from large increases in CO2 
or extreme temperatures. Availability of data from 
Free-Air CO2 Enrichment (FACE) experiments 
[43, 45] is beginning to address this issue but 
many more experiments are needed for many 
more crops under many different conditions to 
understand the complex interactions among 
Carbon, Temperature, Water and Nitrogen 
(CTWN) [46]. Global-scale impact modelling 
poses additional challenges. Assessments 
require high-resolution data on daily weather, 
soil and environmental conditions, crop-specific 
cultivation areas, irrigation and fertilizer use and 
local cropping calendars. High-quality reference 
data are also necessary to facilitate evaluation 
of models at the scales of interest. Finally, many 
applications require long time series of these types 
of data in order to evaluate distributions, trends 
and extremes. Recently, significant progress has 
been made on many of these data requirements, 
notably including global high-resolution time series 
reference data from subnational statistics [47] and 
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hybrid algorithms combining national statistics and 
remotely sensed measures of plant growth [48]. 
A2.3  Accounting for management 
changes and other human 
responses
Technological changes, mainly in the form of 
new cultivars, field management practices and 
industrial production techniques for inorganic 
fertilizers, have led to huge increases in yield in the 
developed world since the end of World War II. 
Most assessments of the future socio-economic 
conditions of the global population assume that 
crop yields in developed countries will continue 
to increase linearly or even exponentially, and that 
crop yields in developing countries will soon begin 
to accelerate, meeting or even exceeding their 
pace of growth in the developed world. The recent 
historical record on growth rates in yield, however, 
is more mixed (as summarized in Section A1.3, in 
[38, 40] and Figure 1). Yield gaps in the developing 
world are generally estimated to be 50 percent 
or more of potential yields [49]. Recent work 
suggests that average maize yields in sub-Saharan 
Africa could be doubled by an increase of fertilizer 
application to about 50 kg/ha nitrogen [50]. While 
modest by global and developed world standards, 
this level would nevertheless require an increase 
in fertilizer availability of more than seven times 
the current level in sub-Saharan Africa and, given 
present day capacities, this increase is unlikely to 
be attained in the near future. 
Much work is also still needed to identify how 
the options for agricultural development and 
adaptation and other likely sociotechnical changes 
might interact with climate changes in the coming 
decades. Towards this goal, the Agricultural Model 
Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) 
has developed protocols [51] for the creation of 
Representative Agricultural Pathways (RAPs), story 
lines and scenario information products for the 
future of agricultural systems that are consistent 
with the Shared Socio-economic Pathways 
[52, 53] and the Representative Concentration 
Pathways [54, 55] created for the IPCC AR5 
process. RAPs are being developed for many 
different systems and modelling purposes, at 
scales ranging from individual farms to national and 
global food systems. 
A3. Future research areas
A3.1  Multimodel assessment and 
intermodel comparison: benefits 
and limitations
Increasingly, the above considerations have driven 
interest in scientific assessments of agricultural 
production, demand, markets and land-use trends. 
Many collaborative initiatives and institutions 
around the world have undertaken large-scale 
projects to address underlying scientific questions 
about productivity and environmental sustainability, 
as well as to gather, produce and distribute 
the technology, data and information products 
required by stakeholders and policy-makers. To 
be credible, these assessments must account 
simultaneously for the socio-economic drivers 
of demand, the environmental limitations and 
changes from a warming climate, and the potential 
and limitations for sociotechnical adaptations to 
vulnerabilities and impacts. To be maximally useful, 
they must additionally be able to address the major 
underlying uncertainties in the system and deliver 
information products and impact measures across 
a wide range of spatial and temporal scales. 
Examples of ongoing collaborative initiatives 
include: AgMIP [51]); ISI-MIP [56]; and the 
Modelling European Agriculture with Climate 
Change for Food Security project (MACSUR, [57]). 
AgMIP includes many and various protocol-
driven climate scenario simulation exercises for 
historical model intercomparison and future climate 
change conditions. It involves ecophysiological 
and agricultural economics modelling groups, 
by extending the multimodel applications from 
global circulation models to ecophysiological 
and economic trade and impact models [51]. 
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ISI-MIP takes a similar protocol-driven approach 
to AgMIP, expanding the sectoral coverage to 
include hydrology, biomes and health impacts 
of climate change. MACSUR is a modelling 
network focusing on impacts of climate change 
on European agriculture [57]. MACSUR integrates 
models covering livestock, crops and economics 
to describe how climate variability and change 
will affect regional farming systems and food 
production in Europe in the short and long terms. 
A3.2  Country-scale assessments: data 
requirements and successful 
case studies
Because of the current international nature of 
agricultural markets and the relevance of global 
change drivers (climate, population, consumption 
and regulation), food security and land-use change 
dynamics must be evaluated at the global scale. 
The effects of food insecurity and environmental 
impacts, however, are largely experienced locally 
and confronted by decision-makers at national or 
regional scales. For this reason, assessments of 
impacts and adaptation potential are also needed 
at national and even sub-national scales. For these 
assessments to be useful at the level expected 
by policy-makers and stakeholders at the regional 
scale, they require higher resolution (in space and 
time) data with improved representations of local 
management practices and potential adaptation 
options (e.g. [58-61] in sub-Saharan Africa, [62, 
63] in South America, [64-66] in South Asia and 
[67] in East Asia). 
A3.3  Model projections and 
uncertainty
Crop models, especially when run at global scale, 
are highly complex models that differ widely in 
terms of process representations, functional 
implementations, data input choices and basic 
assumptions. Even with the same version of the 
same basic underlying model, for example (as in 
the case of the Economics and Policy Innovations 
for Climate-Smart Agriculture (EPIC) and Global 
EPIC (GEPIC) modelling groups from the AgMIP/
ISI-MIP Phase 1 Fast-Track), results often differ 
substantially [4], due to different assumptions 
about planting dates and fertilizer application rates, 
different choices for the functional representation 
of key processes such as evapotranspiration, and 
different implementations of the same functional 
representation (e.g. different choices of parameter 
values). To begin to understand these differences, 
the Global Gridded Crop Model Intercomparison 
(GGCMI), launched by AgMIP in 2013, is carrying 
out a set of simulation experiments run with 
harmonized data for a number of the key inputs 
that drive model differences, including planting 
dates, growing season length, fertilizer application 
rates and atmospheric CO2 concentration 
pathways [68]. 
A3.4  Incorporating current and future 
resource constraints
Concern has been growing recently over 
constraints to agricultural production and 
productivity growth caused by the availability 
of key resources such as land, fresh water and 
fertilizers. These resource constraints are likely to 
compound the negative effects of climate change 
in many regions and hamper efforts at adaptation 
[6]. Climate change will directly affect the availability 
of resources such as fresh water for irrigation [69], 
and sociotechnical changes such as population 
growth and new energy technologies will directly 
affect the supply and availability of other key 
resources, such as land. Evaluation of resource 
availability and constraints must therefore be done 
within a broad multisector context that includes 
assessments by, for example, hydrological models, 
agro-economic and integrated assessment 
models, and ecosystem models. ISI-MIP has made 
some progress in this direction already, including 
agro-economic, hydrology and biome models 
in the fast-track phase, and the next round of 
coordinated assessments should provide greatly 
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improved capacity as a result of the addition of 
new impact sectors such as forestry, biodiversity 
and energy systems models.
A3.5  Emerging and unknown future 
technologies
Technological change is typically incorporated in 
climate impact assessments through relatively 
simple parameterizations of productivity growth 
in agro-economic models, using a method 
that assumes that the effects of technological 
and environmental changes on productivity 
are completely separable [16]. However, the 
interactions between technology and environment 
are usually more complex. For example, new 
tillage practices can reduce the exposure of top 
soil to the air, reducing evaporation, improving soil 
moisture characteristics and reducing sensitivity 
to drought and heat. Breeding can lead to new 
cultivars that send roots down faster and deeper, 
increasing access to water in the soil profile, or 
that are more robust to underwater submergence 
conditions [70] that could become more common 
in a future climate. For these reasons, technological 
change should be included directly in biophysical 
impacts models and assessments through trends 
in model parameters and inputs. Getting this 
right will require renewed engagement between 
modellers, agronomists, and crop breeders. 
A3.6  Improving economic modelling of 
climate impacts in agriculture 
Improving economic analysis as part of modelling 
climate impacts in agriculture requires several 
model improvements. First, it is necessary 
to improve representation and integration of 
biophysical processes into economic models. 
This requires that economists increasingly 
work with researchers from other disciplines, 
recognizing that climate change impacts and their 
analysis pose a multidimensional problem. Also 
required is the ability to model extreme events 
and variable climate conditions, as opposed to 
the usual treatment of gradual climate change, 
which is much harder to detect but for which 
most Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) 
are designed. Economic models also need to 
systematically quantify uncertainties related 
to structure and parameters and to frame 
economic conclusions in the context of known 
model limitations. Expressing the model results 
in probabilistic terms helps decision-makers to 
understand the risks of under- or overinvesting 
in adaptation to high- or low-probability climate 
change outcomes. 
A3.7  Economic modelling of climate 
and trade
Trade is increasingly a subject of analysis within the 
economic modelling of climate change. Economic 
models show that trade can cushion against the 
large production shocks resulting from climate 
change and, if unrestricted, trade is expected to 
increase to compensate for production shortages 
or shifts in production patterns across regions 
due to climate [71-77]. However, the empirical 
evidence is incomplete and fraught with the usual 
caveats related to uncertainty vis-à-vis future 
climate outcomes and developments in climate 
and trade policy. More robust trade analyses in 
the context of climate change should integrate 
direct climate impacts on agricultural productivity, 
demand-side drivers (e.g. consumer diets, 
labelling, subsidies), resource constraints (such as 
climate-induced irrigation water shortages), as well 
as climate policies (e.g. carbon taxes, standards, 
ecolabelling). Moreover, the two-way linkage 
between climate and trade is not a settled issue as 
there remain a number of unanswered questions 
related to the environmental impact of increased 
trade (such as indirect land-use change from 
biofuel trade expansion). 
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B. PART TWO
Critical issues at the 
interface of climate and food 
security 
Robust trends on global agricultural productivity 
are emerging from the growing literature on 
climate impact assessments, with clear indications 
of differential responses across regions. While 
climate change effects on agriculture will be felt 
everywhere, some regions will be more negatively 
affected than others, while some regions may 
benefit from climate warming – up to a point. 
Convergent results are showing negative effects 
on food supply in tropical zones but some 
positive effects in high-latitude regions. Moderate 
warming may benefit crops in the mid and high 
latitudes in the short term. However, any warming 
in seasonally dry and low-latitude regions would 
decrease yields. Densely populated developing 
countries in these regions are vulnerable to 
increased food insecurity [78].
These global trends present the world 
with multiple global challenges (globalization, 
sustainability, climate change, increased 
inequality) locked in increasing interdependence. 
The first global challenge is how to minimize, 
if not reverse, the negative impacts of climate 
on global food supply. Second, climate change 
is likely to exacerbate the growing inequality 
as the brunt of the negative climate effects is 
expected to fall on those countries that are 
least developed and most vulnerable. For these 
countries, low levels of economic development, 
weak institutions, and limited human and 
financial capital all contribute to limited resilience 
capacity. The third challenge is how to develop 
climate-compatible growth strategies that do not 
conflict with mitigation goals required to minimize 
further warming. Fourth is how to sustain policy 
commitments in a world increasingly defined by 
uncertainty, climate variability and greater policy 
interdependence. 
B1. Climate and nutrition: 
Improving analysis of climate-
nutrition-health links 
Adverse global impacts of climate change on 
health, including through malnutrition, are gaining 
increased attention. For example, in Kenya, a 
positive relationship has been observed between 
regional trends in climate (rising temperatures and 
declining rainfall) and childhood stunting since 
1975 [80]. Climate-induced health risks develop 
from a variety of sources, including climate 
influence on food yields, water supply and quality, 
and infectious diseases, as well as the adverse 
health effects of social disruptions, migration and 
conflicts. In addition to adverse effects on food 
supply and adequate nutrition, climate change is 
likely to exacerbate global health concerns such 
as: increased incidence of new influenza virus 
strains; decline of available seafood proteins due 
to ocean warming, acidification and overfishing; 
and worsening freshwater shortages and 
resulting displacements and conflicts [80]. Some 
populations, especially in the least-developed 
countries, will be more negatively affected than 
others. Low-income and remotely located 
populations are more vulnerable to physical 
hazards, undernutrition, diarrhoea and other 
infectious diseases. Populations in low-lying islands 
and coastal areas, like Bangladesh, are also 
vulnerable to increased storm surges and flooding 
as the sea levels rise [80].
There is relatively little research on the 
implications for food quality and possible 
implications on human nutrition. A recent study 
reported that C3 grains (e.g. wheat, rice) and 
legumes have lower concentrations of zinc and iron 
when grown under field conditions with elevated 
CO2 levels [44]. C3 crops other than legumes also 
have lower concentrations of protein. Analysis of 
food balance sheets from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) found 
that in 2010 roughly 667 million people were living 
in countries whose populations received at least 
60 percent of their dietary zinc and iron from C3 
grains or legumes. Similarly, 1.9 billion people who 
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lived in these countries received at least 70 percent 
of one or both of these nutrients from these crops 
[44]. In the case of reduced proteins, the health 
implications from consuming non-leguminous C3 
plants are not uniform across regions and depend 
on local food patterns. In India, where up to a third 
of the rural population is at risk of not meeting 
protein requirements, and who depend on C3 
plants, decreased protein content due to higher 
CO2 levels may have serious health consequences 
[44]. An extensive meta-analysis, covering 
7761 observations and 130 species/cultivars, 
corroborated these findings [81]. This study found 
that elevated CO2 reduces the overall mineral 
concentrations (by 8%) and increases the total 
non-structural carbohydrates (mainly starch and 
sugars) in C3 plants. These results offer the first 
robust documentation of the adverse nutritional 
impact of climate change, which can exacerbate 
the prevalence of “hidden hunger” and obesity. 
In the economic realm, the IMPACT modelling 
framework provides projections of climate impacts 
beyond production changes, all the way to nutrition 
outcomes. For example, the number and share 
of children who are malnourished in Africa is 
projected to be higher with climate change than 
without climate change, but both the number and 
share of malnourished children would fall between 
2010 and 2050 as incomes rise for other reasons 
(Chapter 5, Table 13). However, more systematic 
probing of the nutritional implications of climate 
impacts on food security is required to generate 
the evidence required for appropriate policy 
response. 
B2.  Climate and water:  
Growing need for systematic 
climate-food-water analysis
Much of the climate change impact on agriculture 
is mediated through water. In many regions of 
the world, increased water scarcity under climate 
change will present a major challenge for climate 
adaptation. It is of paramount importance to 
address the implications of future water availability 
for food security and, by extension, nutrition 
and health. This requires improved modelling of 
hydrological processes and climate impacts on 
water dynamics at appropriate scales. It is also 
important to address the economics of water use, 
taking into account the special nature of water as 
a resource requiring a balanced approach between 
market instruments and institutional structures.
Hydrological modelling is a growing field 
of research. Improvements in downscaling 
techniques are making it possible to reconcile 
the scale gaps between large-scale climate 
impacts and local-scale hydrological processes. 
Interlinked models have also been designed 
to reconcile the scale difference between the 
basin-level hydrological models and the more 
aggregate (or national) level economic models. As 
water availability has become a global concern 
in light of climate change, more quantitative 
global hydrological and economic models are 
required to help facilitate global policy dialogue 
on water issues. Recent work has assessed 
the global impact of diet change on the blue 
(irrigated) and green (rainfed) water footprints 
of food consumption [82]. The study showed 
that when the dietary guidelines are followed, 
gradually limiting the amount of total protein 
intake from animal products to 50 percent, 
25 percent, 12.5 percent and finally 0 percent 
reduced water consumption by 6 percent, 
11 percent, 15 percent and 21 percent for green 
water, and by 4 percent, 6 percent, 9 percent and 
14 percent for blue water, respectively [82]. These 
results suggest that reducing animal products in 
the human diet offers the potential to save water 
resources, up to the amount currently required to 
feed 1.8 billion additional people globally. 
Economists argue for higher reliance on water 
markets and water pricing regimes as an effective 
adaptation tool to help facilitate water use by 
considering higher-value uses. At the same time, 
water is not a typical commodity, but a resource 
whose use is geographically bound, and whose 
access is determined by rights (not just by market 
value) and managed through public institutions. 
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Water economics present a number of modelling 
challenges because water is a resource whose 
use can be optimized in part through market 
instruments but which requires strong institutional 
structures to ensure people’s rightful and equitable 
access to water. Modelling economics of water 
requires improved specification of the level and 
structure of water prices, the scope of water 
trading between users and across basins and 
the costs of water infrastructure investments. A 
key challenge is the availability of data, which 
are localized and managed by subnational 
agencies and lack consistency across regions. 
More importantly, economic water modelling 
improvements require including the political 
economy dimension of water markets (e.g. non-
price water conservation mandates, legal property 
rights regimes).
B3. Climate mitigation and 
food security:  
Co-benefits versus trade-offs 
Climate change mitigation measures that affect 
food security involve reducing emissions from 
many sources. Several technologies targeting 
adaptation can also have mitigation co-benefits. 
Examples include new varieties with higher yields 
and enhanced pest and drought resistance, 
carbon sequestration and ability to survive on 
marginal lands. 
Climate change mitigation and adaptation have 
revived discussion about the role of agricultural 
biotechnology and its potential to intensify 
production of food while reducing pressure 
on cropland. However, the potential value of 
biotechnology has been contested, and its 
dissemination is limited by demands for product 
labelling and other environmental approvals and 
controls under the Biosafety Protocol of the United 
Nations Convention on Biodiversity. Whether 
biotechnology can find a place among mitigation 
measures to combat climate change remains an 
open question. 
Biofuel production falls at the interface between 
renewable energy and climate mitigation. Support 
to biofuel production in the last two decades, 
especially in the United States and Western 
Europe, was prompted in part as a contribution to 
climate mitigation. However, biofuels have become 
controversial, especially in relation to indirect land-
use change and its association with increased 
carbon emissions (linked to deforestation). While 
awaiting economic breakthroughs for second-
generation biofuels, current biofuel production from 
crops (rapeseed, maize, canola, sugar cane, soy, 
palm oil) is expected to continue over the medium 
term. Given that the net effect on mitigation of 
current biofuels is still uncertain, many countries 
have taken a more cautionary approach. Earlier 
drives for biofuel investments in developing 
countries have been scaled back due to concerns 
over food security conflicts. In the area of research, 
modelling biofuels within integrated assessment 
models requires more detailed account of land-use 
change effects. Also required are further advances 
in analysing climate-energy-food linkages and 
taking into account policy instruments and 
technology advances. 
Nitrogen fertilizer – a critical input for 
agricultural productivity for non-legume crops – 
also presents a trade-off in terms of climate 
mitigation. Reducing emissions related to the 
production and use of nitrogen fertilizer will 
increase its cost, reduce its use and hence 
prevent yield gains required for intensification. 
There are, in fact, multiple trade-offs. The first is 
between food production and climate mitigation. 
Another trade-off is between intensifying 
agricultural production with the use of fertilizers, 
which lessens land pressure (hence lowering 
emissions), or reducing emissions from fertilizer 
production, resulting in stagnant yields and higher 
pressure on forests and grasslands. Clearly a 
balanced approach is required, one that ensures 
fertilizers remain affordable to farmers but with 
improvements in use efficiency (through better 
fertilizer delivery technologies) that would allow 
for lower fertilizer use without negatively affecting 
yield. 
chapter 1: global assessments of climate impacts on food systems: 
a summary of findings and policy recommendations
13
B4.  Climate and trade: 
Understanding the trends and 
tackling trade-offs
Climate change fundamentally alters global food 
production patterns and, given the fact that 
impacts are expected to be worse in low-latitude 
regions, climate change is likely to exacerbate 
existing imbalances between the developed and 
developing world. For crop impacts at least, there 
is now a coherent pattern of yield changes across 
the world, with yields expected to increase in some 
higher latitude regions until about the mid-century 
before declining, but with almost immediate 
declines in yields across the tropics [83]. Spatial 
differences are also observed at regional and 
subregional scales, particularly where there are 
substantial differences in elevation. The impacts of 
climate change (and of climate mitigation policies 
[84-87]) thus have a major impact on patterns of 
global trade [88].
It is clear from climate change impact 
assessments to date that trade will probably 
expand under climate change. Trade flows would 
increase from mid to high latitudes towards low-
latitude regions, where production and export 
potential will be reduced [78]. Climate change 
is also projected to cause wide variations in the 
net global food supply as the result of a higher 
frequency of droughts and extreme weather 
events [78]. Climate change can transform 
trade by altering the comparative advantages, 
while more frequent extreme weather patterns 
have an adverse impact on trade by disrupting 
transportation, supply chains and logistics [89].
Trade can also affect climate change. 
Increased economic activity, including trade, also 
increases greenhouse gas emissions. In many 
developing countries that have weak enforcement 
of environmental protection, growing demand for 
food crops drives the expansion of production for 
exports (maize, rice, biofuel feedstocks). In other 
cases, unregulated exports of forest products can 
exacerbate deforestation, land degradation and 
loss of biodiversity. 
Global markets can play a stabilizing role for 
prices and supplies and provide alternative food 
options for negatively affected regions by changing 
conditions or by finding regions where food can 
be produced more efficiently (both in terms of 
environmental and economic costs). However, 
trade alone is not a sufficient adaptation strategy, 
owing to several trade-offs. First, there is serious 
tension between trade versus the environment. 
Second, dependence on imports to meet food 
needs may increase the risk of exposure to higher 
market and price volatility that is expected under 
climate change. A recent example can serve as 
an illustration of future trends. The extreme heat 
and wildfires in western Russia in the summer 
of 2010 destroyed one-third of that country’s 
wheat yield, and the subsequent ban on exported 
grain contributed to a rise in the price of wheat 
worldwide, exacerbating hunger in Russia and in 
low-income urban populations in countries such as 
Pakistan and Egypt [80].
The spatial dimension of climate change impacts 
will be critical to the development of trade policies. 
Müller and Elliott (Chapter 2) show how the impacts 
of climate change on the production of food calories 
could vary spatially by the end of the century. 
They attribute uncertainties in these projections 
to patchy coverage of data for model calibration 
and testing, lack of knowledge of management 
practices across the modelling domain and limited 
physiological understanding of crop response to 
elevated CO
2. They conclude that “consideration of 
various scenarios on future agricultural management 
is crucial” to the assessment of future agricultural 
productivity under climate change.
In addition to the direct impact of climate 
change on primary production, changing socio-
economics can alter comparative advantages 
and trade flows, and potentially alter future 
international competitiveness and agrifood trade 
patterns (see Ahammad, Chapter 10). Model 
projections of imports and exports under climate 
change showed differences across scenarios 
due to non-climate economic, demographic and 
technology assumptions. However, Ahammad 
identified common trends across climate change 
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model runs, such as the continued importance 
of the United States as a net exporter of coarse 
grains and oilseeds in 2050 and that net trade 
for the fast-growing developing economies and 
exports were both projected to decrease by much 
less than the projected decline in production 
attributable to climate change. Various projections 
for trade in China showed contrasting responses 
on trade, highlighting an important area in which 
the evidence is uncertain. 
B5.  Climate and poverty: 
Mainstreaming adaptation into 
development
Combating climate change must go hand in 
hand with alleviating poverty. Adverse effects of 
climate are greater among the poor in developing 
countries, who are highly dependent on climate-
sensitive natural resources yet have the least 
adaptive capacity to cope with climate impacts. 
There is general agreement that development 
investments in climate change impact are 
competing with efforts to eradicate poverty over 
the medium term [91]. 
Consequently, there is increasing support for 
mainstreaming climate change responses within 
human development and poverty alleviation rather 
than pursuing separate climate and poverty tracks 
and risking potentially negative outcomes for one 
or the other of these goals. Such mainstreaming 
would require policies that can achieve co-benefits 
for poverty alleviation, climate adaptation and 
greenhouse gas emission reduction [92, 93, 
94]. Mainstreaming involves the integration of 
information, policies and measures to address 
climate change in ongoing development planning 
and decision-making. Mainstreaming should 
create “no regrets” opportunities for achieving 
development that are resilient to current and future 
climate impacts for the most vulnerable groups, 
and avoid potential trade-offs between adaptation 
and development strategies, which can result in 
maladaptation [91]. 
Given that the task of alleviating poverty 
is itself formidable, adding climate adaptation 
and mitigation hugely complicates the process, 
requiring an innovative framework commensurate 
with the complexity at hand yet tractable to achieve 
results. While there is no single methodology 
to achieve this, some basic concepts exist that 
can guide mainstreaming adaptation [92]. First 
among these is the view that climate adaptation is 
inseparable from the cultural, economic, political, 
environmental and developmental contexts in 
which it occurs. Second, responses to climate 
change often cross spatial and jurisdictional 
boundaries, requiring coordination to avoid 
maladaptation. Third, because of positive feedback 
loops, system trajectories are path-dependent and 
difficult to change. Fourth, contested rules, values 
and knowledge cultures determine social decision-
making processes which respond to change [95]. 
These basic guidelines clearly suggest a paradigm 
shift between research, policy and practice [92] so 
that adaptation pathways must be able to trigger 
a change along each of three components. Such 
a shift also means that processes and tools must 
be developed among all the key stakeholders who 
can facilitate and manage the contested decision-
making arena [92]. 
In practice, how mainstreaming is achieved 
depends on the adaptation approach taken – 
that is, technology-based (impacts-based) or 
development-based (vulnerability-based) [91]. 
Under the former, mainstreaming ensures that 
projections of climate change impacts are 
considered in the decision-making about climate 
investments (known as “climate-proofing”). With 
the development-based view, adaptation goes 
beyond “climate-proofing” and recognizes the 
implication of many actors and the importance 
of an enabling environment. This approach 
emphasizes the need to remove existing financial, 
legal, institutional and knowledge barriers to 
adaptation, and to strengthen the capacity of 
people and organizations to adapt. A review 
by the World Resources Institute of over 100 
“adaptation” interventions found that adaptation 
and development are not totally separable. These 
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interventions lie along a continuum, from those 
that overlap almost completely with development 
practices that build general resilience to those that 
are focused more specifically on climate change 
impacts. [96] 
As an illustration of adaptation mainstreaming, 
a recent study from Bangladesh describes a 
framework that follows a linear sequence of 
stages, starting with raising awareness, scientific 
capacity building, generating evidence and 
conducting pilot studies to inform and engage the 
decision-makers in policy planning [91]. Building 
awareness is a critical first step towards generating 
enough interest on the part of decision-makers 
to demand climate vulnerability information. It is 
necessary to generate evidence that can show 
how and why climate vulnerability is a problem 
requiring integration into development decisions. 
Locally developed information is more likely to be 
relevant to the decision-making contexts of country 
decision-makers. Investing in building national 
capacity is required to generate locally appropriate 
evidence that is connected to the body of 
international climate science. For least-developed 
countries, technology transfer is a critical requisite 
for successful adaptation strategy and requires 
creative options to relax the patents and other 
intellectual property protection constraints to 
technology transfer from advanced countries to 
developing countries [97]. The next stage in the 
framework calls for pilot studies to inform policy-
makers and to generate incentives to incorporate 
the lessons learned into policy planning. The final 
stage involves the full integration of climate change 
adaptation into policy and planning across different 
sectors and scales, requiring investment planning 
that combines “climate proofing” with building 
resilience among the climate-vulnerable poor. 
It is at this stage that government stakeholders 
and decision-makers become fully engaged in 
adaptation planning. 
As our understanding of climate and food 
security increases, we need to steer it beyond 
crop yield impacts and expand the debate into 
new drivers of food productivity (biotechnology, 
bioenergy and trade). Climate impact on food 
security should be broadened systematically 
to include nutrition and health. Of particular 
relevance is the need to broaden the crop 
coverage to include crops important for regional 
(not necessarily global) food security, as well as 
other land- use enterprises (livestock, agroforestry). 
Climate impact should also be linked with poverty 
alleviation and sustainability of resources (water, 
soils, nitrogen fertilizer). Climate impact science 
also needs to become more systems-based and 
multidimensional. For example, addressing the 
health risks of climate change requires a cross-
sectional approach because health risks are tied 
to such sectors as water, agriculture and energy. 
Improved frameworks are necessary to examine 
cross-sectoral linkages such as climate-food-trade 
[79], climate-nutrition-health, climate-food-water 
and climate-food-energy. In addition, global climate 
impact analysis should “come down to earth” 
and be validated at the local level, accounting for 
spatial variability, possible adaptation responses, 
local resource availabilities and constraints, and 
socio-economic determinants. 
C.  PART THREE
Policy messages, 
communication and the need 
for two-way science-policy 
dialogue
C1.  Matching evidence on 
climate impacts to the 
needs of policy-makers
Robust and reliable evidence is critical to the 
development of policies to address climate 
impacts on agriculture, food and trade. When 
used effectively, evidence can be used to guide 
decisions on policy, highlight options for policy 
action and also identify areas where insufficient 
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evidence currently exists. However, the interaction 
between those generating evidence (climate 
science) and the needs of those developing policy 
is not straightforward. This section considers which 
factors contribute to an effective science-policy 
dialogue and highlights examples from this volume 
of evidence about climate impacts on agriculture, 
food and trade that are relevant to policy. It 
concludes with a recommendation for a forum to 
enable more effective dialogue between science 
and policy.
There is often a mis-match between the type 
of evidence produced from the climate impact 
research community and what is needed for policy 
development. This can be illustrated with two 
contrasting examples. The first is that primary 
evidence, as it is produced, is often too detailed. 
At the time of publication of the first report of the 
IPCC in 1990 (with a supplement in 1992) [98], 
little was known about the impacts of human-
induced climate change on agricultural crops 
and livestock. The synthesis of climate science 
knowledge by the IPCC prompted crop scientists 
to begin investigating the direct effects of warmer 
temperatures, changed rainfall patterns and 
elevated concentrations of CO2 on the growth of 
crops. Over the next two decades many thousands 
of research papers reported findings on the direct 
impacts of climate change on all of the world’s 
major food crops in many different countries and 
regions. This work provided a wealth of detail, but 
on its own the evidence is not easily interpreted 
by those looking for high-level conclusions on 
climate impacts across the sector to guide policy 
formulation. Instead, it is the syntheses of primary 
research that more closely meet the policy need 
for robust and coherent statements of evidence 
from the underpinning science. Good examples 
of evidence syntheses include: the “impacts” 
chapters of the subsequent IPCC reports, most 
recently in 2014 [99]; a systematic review of crop 
impacts in Africa and Asia [100]; and a recent 
meta-analysis of climate change impacts on crops 
[101]. These syntheses of knowledge provide 
robust statements of current evidence that can be 
used with a degree of confidence by those looking 
for summaries of the state of evidence on climate 
impacts. A number of such statements regarding 
climate impacts on food security were recently 
proposed [83].
The second example of a mis-match between 
evidence needs for policy and research knowledge 
is that the evidence is often not specific enough 
to base policy and operational decisions on it. 
This may seem to contradict the first point – 
that research evidence is too detailed – but it 
is a different issue, best illustrated through an 
example. Knox and colleagues [100] reviewed all 
studies to date of climate impacts on the major 
food crops across Africa and South Asia using 
systematic review criteria as a quality filter. A range 
of modelling methods, time periods and ensemble 
sizes (from a single climate model to ensembles of 
20 or more climate models) were included. They 
found that average crop yields were projected to 
decline across both regions by 8 percent by the 
2050s. Across Africa, yields were projected to 
change by -17 percent (wheat), -5 percent (maize), 
-15 percent (sorghum) and -10 percent (millet), 
and across South Asia by -16 percent (maize) 
and -11 percent (sorghum) under climate change. 
No mean change in yield was detected for rice. 
These are all clear and robust statements of impact 
for crops and regions for which there is good 
coverage in the evidence base. However, for many 
crop and country combinations there was not 
enough evidence to draw any general conclusions; 
thus, the authors concluded that the evidence 
was either inconclusive, absent or contradictory 
for rice, cassava and sugar cane. Those looking 
for evidence for important African staples such as 
yam, millet and bananas on which to base climate 
adaptation policies will find almost nothing on 
which to base policy advice.
Those that work on the science-policy dialogue 
are not necessarily drawn from only research 
institutions or policy organizations. Instead there 
are a raft of intermediary organizations, such 
as think tanks, civil society organizations and 
consultancies, that synthesize, filter, reinterpret 
and reorganize evidence to aid the uptake of 
information into policy. For example, the Climate 
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Development and Knowledge Network [102] 
combines research, advisory services and 
knowledge management in support of locally 
owned and managed policy processes. Where 
these organizations also act as portals, they can 
facilitate sharing of evidence, experiences and 
lessons from past and current policy initiatives.
A common barrier to the uptake of evidence 
into policy is that the evidence does not meet, or is 
not presented in a way that meets, the information 
needs of those developing policy. Often the 
research community does not start by defining 
the information needs of the policy community, 
but instead works from the evidence in search of 
applications in policy. Such an approach is often 
ineffective and will also contributes to a mis-match 
of information with needs for evidence. The way 
in which science is communicated for policy 
development is different from a simple technical 
summary of the research. For example, the IPCC 
Summaries for Policy-makers are quite different 
from the Technical Summaries, even though both 
are based on the same synthesis of evidence. 
Effort invested in matching the form of evidence 
communication to the needs of the intended 
reader is clearly worthwhile.
Finally, the timing of evidence for policy is 
absolutely critical. Evidence needs to adjust to 
policy and political cycles. Many policy-advising 
intermediary organizations have addressed these 
communication barriers to provide finer-level and 
more rapid analyses tailored to specific policy 
requirements for information and knowledge.
C2.  Policy insights on climate 
change impacts under 
uncertainty 
Most policies have to cope with levels of 
uncertainty in the evidence base they use. This is 
definitely the case for climate adaptation policies, 
perhaps more so than in other policy areas. 
Uncertainties for climate policy arise regarding 
greenhouse gas emission scenarios and from the 
climate and crop models that are used to form 
projections of future impacts. Numerical methods 
can be used to better define the boundaries of 
uncertainty, by running ensembles of climate 
models [103] or by systematically varying 
parameters within climate [104] or crop models 
[105], but considerable uncertainty in projections 
will still remain. Rötter and Höhn (Chapter 4, 
Figure 1) show how uncertainties and errors in 
climate change impact modelling are propagated 
along the impact modelling chain.
Policy advice will often define options for 
action. A robust assessment of the uncertainties 
in impact projections can contribute to at least a 
qualitative statement of the risks about individual 
policy options. Indeed, the absence of any 
statement of uncertainty implies that each option 
is equally uncertain. However, it is likely that the 
precision of these statements will at most be 
approximate. The calibrated language used by 
the IPCC to communicate uncertainties in climate 
science and impacts evidence is a good example 
[106]. Confidence in IPCC conclusions from the 
evidence is a product of the degree of expert 
agreement and the completeness of the evidence 
base. The likelihood of particular conclusions is 
defined by a seven point scale – from exceptionally 
unlikely (0-1% probability) to virtually certain (99-
100% probability). The guidelines conclude with 
the recommendation for contributing authors 
to “communicate uncertainty carefully, using 
calibrated language for key findings, and provide 
traceable accounts describing your evaluations of 
evidence and agreement” [106].
Within the climate impacts research community, 
formal treatment of uncertainties is often done well, 
particularly with regard to direct climate impacts 
on crops or livestock and in cases where these 
uncertainties are of biophysical origin [107, 108]. 
However, policies for the agricultural sector or for 
food trade have to consider a much wider range 
of uncertainties from political, economic and 
social sources that are often far harder to foresee 
and account for than those from biophysical 
sources. Simulation modelling of possible impact 
and adaptation pathways can help to at least 
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explore uncertainties in these possible “futures”. 
Examples include the Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios (SRES) socio-economic pathways 
developed for the IPCC reports [109], and similar 
approaches used for the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment [110]. However, simply defining a 
specific set of possible socio-economic pathways 
constrains the exploration of uncertainties to 
those within the boundaries of these projected 
futures. Lioubimtseva et al. (Chapter 6) conclude 
that economic and institutional changes in Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan have dominated historic 
changes in grain exports, although there is also 
an impact of weather variability. The projected 
effects of climate change by 2020 on grain exports 
in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan differed in 
direction – i.e. decreased exports for Ukraine, 
increased exports for Russia and Kazakhstan – 
and in magnitude, between  SRES B2 and A2 
socio-economic scenarios (Table 12, Chapter 6).
Climate change as a result of human activities 
will produce changes in both the mean and 
variability of climate. Changes in variability add 
a further dimension to policy development, 
introducing an element of risk management 
for adaptation responses and the possibility of 
threshold events, such as shocks to primary 
productivity, price or demand for food products 
[83]. Risk-based approaches to climate 
adaptation have been developed in response to 
the challenges of sea-level rise, but climate risks 
in the agriculture and food sector are inherently 
more complex.
The concept of resilience came from ecology 
and describes the ability of an ecological system 
to recover from a shock, climatic or otherwise. 
In recent years, those working on adaptation to 
climate change have applied these concepts to 
other natural and social systems. The thinking 
is that better resilience to climate variability 
and change can be increased through building 
biological and institutional capacity to respond 
to shocks, by investing in infrastructure, social 
protection measures and so on. An appealing 
aspect of this approach is that it does not matter 
what the precise degree of projected climate 
change is, a more resilient society should be better 
prepared for climate change impacts.
Any effective development intervention to 
address adaptation should be able to evaluate 
its outcomes. For adaptation to climate change 
this is difficult. Waiting until the year 2030, for 
example, is not a useful strategy. This is a current 
topic of debate, but a resilience approach seems 
to address well the problems of making decisions 
in the face of uncertainty around climate change 
and its impacts and the challenges of local-
scale vulnerability. However, to date there are 
very few examples of evaluation of resilience of 
communities and societies in practice. Resilience 
is often evaluated with respect to climate variability 
in the current climate, but when we expect a 
change in the mean and variability of climate in 
the future, how effective can this evaluation be? 
Risk management options for agriculture under 
climate change still constitute an important gap in 
the evidence. Indeed Rötter and Höhn (Chapter 4) 
conclude that there is a “lack of a comprehensive, 
well-tested methodology for the assessment of 
multiple risks to crop production under climate 
change”.
C3.  Harmonizing climate with 
trade policy 
Policy tension between climate mitigation and 
trade-related economic growth is a necessary 
outcome that requires careful analysis and 
appropriate response. While climate science is 
indisputable, trade policy analysis in the context 
of climate change is far from conclusive and more 
analytical work is required to arrive at climate-
compatible trade policies. In addition, the role 
of trade measures in the context of international 
negotiations on climate change stabilization is 
unclear. There is no consensus as to whether 
current World Trade Organization (WTO) trade 
rules can promote adherence to climate goals or 
are a threat to mutually agreed climate solutions 
[78]. Many of the hotly debated issues in the Doha 
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Round trade negotiations, including new special 
safeguard mechanisms, could take on renewed 
relevance when considering climate change. 
The proposal to expand the mandate of the 
Environmental Goods and Services negotiations to 
include all biofuels is another area of contention, 
despite its potential to advance more efficient and 
resource-friendly biofuel production, especially from 
second generation biofuels. Climate change also 
underscores the need to help developing countries 
deal with food and energy price increases, as well 
as volatile food supplies. 
A number of climate change mitigation 
policies are potentially affected by trade rules 
[78]. Developed countries that impose national 
mitigation measures (such as carbon taxes, or 
cap-and-trade regimes) counter the potential shift 
of production (“leakage”) overseas with unilateral 
import taxes. Without international agreement on 
climate policy, such measures would be challenged 
under WTO rules. Standards and certification 
systems can be important tools in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. However, the use of 
standards, particularly by governments, may 
clash with WTO rules. Environmental payments 
for services, such as payments for forest and 
soil carbon sequestration, can also address 
climate change mitigation. However, if granted by 
governments, these payments could clash with 
WTO subsidy rules. These cases make clear the 
need to harmonize rules with climate objectives. 
Progress on climate-compatible trade policy 
requires tackling the considerable apprehension 
that climate measures can distort trade, and 
alternatively, that trade rules could stand in the 
way of greater progress on climate change [90]. 
In the short term, opportunities for conflict exist 
as countries pursue unilateral policy choices to 
stabilize emissions through regulatory regimes, 
taxation and other instruments. In the longer 
term, trade rules that do not allow internalization 
of the cost of carbon would negatively affect 
climate change mitigation. Tariff structures could 
be tailored to internalize the cost of carbon and 
greenhouse gas emissions so that countries can 
assess higher tariffs on carbon-intensive goods 
than on goods with lesser carbon footprints [78]. 
Likewise, future climate change mitigation policies 
should include measures designed to internalize 
the environmental costs of resources. 
C4.  Recommendations for 
structured science-policy 
dialogue
Despite the very real uncertainties in the underlying 
science, decisions still need to be made by a 
whole range of decision-makers, from policy-
makers to practitioners in the agricultural sector 
(Chapter 10). Decisions can only be made using 
the best evidence that is available at the time 
and they cannot wait until “perfect” knowledge is 
achieved. Wheeler and von Braun [83] provided 
examples of evidence statements that could be 
used by those making decisions as policy-makers 
and practitioners confronted with the prospect of 
climate change impacts on food security, despite 
very real uncertainties in current knowledge and 
future trends. These statements were:
1. Climate change impacts on food security will 
be worst in countries already suffering high 
levels of hunger and will worsen over time.
2. The consequences for global undernutrition 
and malnutrition of doing nothing in response 
to climate change are potentially large, and will 
increase over time.
3. Food inequalities will increase, from local to 
global levels, because the degree of climate 
change and the extent of its effects on people 
will differ from one part of the world to another, 
from one community to the next and between 
rural and urban areas.
4. People and communities who are vulnerable 
to the effects of extreme weather now will 
become more vulnerable in the future and less 
resilient to climate shocks.
5. There is a commitment to climate change 
of 20-30 years into the future as a result of 
past emissions of greenhouse gases that 
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necessitates immediate adaptation actions to 
address global food insecurity over the next 
two to three decades.
6. Extreme weather events are likely to become 
more frequent in the future and will increase 
risks and uncertainties within the global food 
system.
How can a structured two-way dialogue 
be achieved between science and policy for 
production and trade impacts of climate change? 
One possibility is to set up a structured forum 
dedicated to providing a portal to climate change 
impact evidence for agriculture and policy for trade 
and food security. Such a forum could focus on: 
the exchange and dissemination of knowledge 
of latest impact assessment models related to 
climate-food-trade, climate-food-water, Climate 
Adaptation and mitigation measures linked to food 
security, and climate adaptation mainstreaming 
into development. The forum should provide 
the scientific links between global and regional 
climate assessments and facilitate exchange of 
knowledge between international and regional 
research centres and between researchers and 
policy makers. The forum could also operate along 
specific regional themes focusing on hot spot 
areas, common regional problems (priority sectors 
of regional significance; regional water scarcity 
problems; soil fertility; regional capacity in research 
& development). The forum could also facilitate 
policy feedback back to science to improve data, 
information and knowledge related to future 
developments in agriculture in relation to climate 
change.
The forum should define a number of core 
principles to guide its ways of working including 
a firm commitment that evidence generation is 
demand-led by those in policy; robust and detailed 
assessments of uncertainties in evidence; and an 
emphasis on high standards of communication of 
evidence for policy. The forum should also build on 
and leverage expertise within existing knowledge 
networks, international organizations dedicated to 
climate change food security and specialized in 
adaptation, mitigation, water, trade and relevant 
policy analysis. We can be certain that climate 
change impacts on agricultural production and 
trade will be substantial, will change over time and 
will bring challenges to those making policy that 
have not been encountered to date. These features 
alone make the establishment of a structured 
forum dedicated to providing a portal to climate 
change impact evidence for agriculture and policy 
for trade and food security an urgent prerogative 
for policy development.
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